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The data problem is, except for a fortunate few, still
an insurmountable problem for many China researchers,
The extent to which China researchers can accurately
and coniprehensively "re-construct" empirical reality in China
through the intermediaries of published materials, refugee-
interviews and travelogues is indeed very questionable. The
researcher is denied primary experiences in the empirical
phenomena under investigation. However diligently he immerses
himself into these diverse sources, China remains to him a
distant reality. If this feeling is not shared by everyone, it
is at least acutely experienced by this writer. However finely
he articulates reality. through these verbal and writ ten sourms,
he still cannot confidently advise himself, "You Imow what
actually happens and how it actually happens." Research on
contemporary China, moreover, has to justify itself in the light
of data available in the press and other published materials.
The problem is a much more fundamental one than that which
stem from the limited perspective provided by any source of
information."l Different sources are suggestive of dissimilar
perspectives. The more fundamental problem is How can the
analyst es tablish the epistemological status of the data? How
can he tell propagandistic cliches from ideas that have an
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actual bearing on socio-political life? The problem for the
analyst is to determine the contexts and situations in Which
ideological language becomes meaningful categories for social
action, the extent to which this occurs and does not occur.
To this problem there is no immediate solution.
Perplexed as he is, the researcher ,does not 'need to be
debarred, for these reasons, from China, studies. Empirical
research in the present China research context can ultimately
be justified not so much in terms of how much more it advances
our understanding of Communist Chinese society as in terms of
how much it contributes to the development of soc•iologi cal.
theory, i.e. in terms of its contribution to the initiation,
reformulation, refocusing and clarification of theory.2 As an
exploratory attempt in the field. of communication of innovations
in Communist China 3 this study is predominantly concer-ned
with exploiting the opportunity afforded by new data arising
out of an apparently totally new. society for reformulating
and extending existing conceptual schemes in the analysis of
innovation diffusion, One of its central concern in this
regard is the generation of conceptual categories which
hopefully may ultimately integrate themselves into a sociological
theory of innovation diffusion, a task the accomplishment of
which lies beyond the capacity of this paper. The analytical
.theory so developed may not only encompass, often revising and
extending, existing sociological theories in innovation diffusion
but may also provide for the fuller comprehension of both
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folk theories and the perceived social facts on which they
are based."4 In other words, they need also to encompass, on
a higher level of generality and analytical abstractness, the
Chinese system of explanation which is based on the ideology
of the Chinese Communist Party. One important implication of
this is that : the folk system of categories can themselves
contribute to the development of sociological conceptualization.
The ideology of the Chirese Communist Party has self-consciously
addressed itself to the planned process of innovation diffusion
and as such has developed categorical distinctions and inter-
.relationships which are proto-sociological in form in the sense
that they implicitly suggest to the sociologists new ways of
slicing up the general phenomena of innovation diffusion. The
folk model, in other words, can be treated not merely as a
"topic"--a phenomenon to be analyzed, but as a resource--an




This paper offers an analysis of the phenomena of
planned intervention in the diffusion of agro--technical iniio---
vations* in.Communist China since 1957.
Following Everett Rogers, we may regard social change
as "the process by which alteration occurs in the structure
and function of a social system .l The dynamic core of social
change evolves around the adoption and diffusion of innovations.
"Often the result of the adoption and diffusion processes is a
change in the structure or function of the relevant social
system." 2 How social actors intervene in the processes of
adoption and diffusion becomes then an important area of con-
cern for the student of Planned change.
Innovation has been ciei:inea as any iaea, pzae wee,
or material artifact perceived to be new by the relevant unit
of adoption. See Zaltman and Lin, On the nature of innovations",
American Behavioral Scientist, XIV,no.5. (iiay-June 1971), pp.
656-'657. The newness of an innovation, in other words, de-
rives from the way it is perceived, It does not need to be
"objectively newto be an innovation. We shall see, in later
analysis, that innovations in Communist China are not only
perceived as nety , but also as advanced. The cultural con-
text of an innovation constrains the way it is perceived by
the unit of adoption. When used as a verb, innovation
refers to the act of adopting an innovation. Innovation
situation, in this sense, refers to the situation in which
the potential adopter has to decide on whether or not to
innovate,
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Researchers on innovation diffusion have in one way or
another agreed on defining "diffusion" as "the process by which
an innovation is spread through communication channels to
members of a social system over time".3 The four generally
recognized 'gcrrucial elements in the diffusion of new ideas,
more specifically, are "(1)the innovation (2) which is. com ,iuni-
cated through certain channels(3)over time (4)among the membaxs
of a social system.4 Less uniform, however, are heir views on
how such processes are brought about. Zaltman and Lin consider
diffusion as occuring mainly through "patterned interaction
among adopter and potential adopter units."5 They are less
explicit, however, about the nature of such "patterned interaction.'
Whereas diffusion is emergent from "patterned interaction"
differential interaction pat terns are, it appears, reed to
diverse patterns of diffusion, a determinant of which is the
extent to which the process is planned and controlled. This
complication is also reflected in the attempt by a few authors
to restrict the use of the ten in "diffusion" to unplanned com-
munication of innovations as opposed to the concept of dis-
semination", which they define as planned commvnication.6
If we retain the term diffusion to generically cover both the
former and the latter type, distinctions can be dratrm between
patterns of diffusion in which there is a high degree of
plannedness" and patterns of diffusion in which the communi-
cation of inhovations is. unplaiToed.
Depending on the degree to which the process of di-
ffusion islann.ed or unplanned, two polar modes of diffusion
3can be analytically delineated: Type 1, in which diffusion
unfolds itself through individuals freely interacting with
one another. No parameters are set over (1)what. is com.muni--
cated (2) through what channels (3) for how long and (4) among
whom. The spreading of rumours represent an ideal. typical case
of Type 1. diffusion. There is no control over what is communi-
cated (rumours become increasingly distorted), through what
channels (from whispering to mass media exposure). for hose
long (some rumours die suddenly, some last longer),, and amongst
whom. The innovator of the misconstrued information has vir-
tually no control over the development of the process and its
often unanticipated consequences. Type 2 diffusion represents
the polar opposite. A supra--agenc yf° .plans and regulates the
entire process, controlling over the four crucial elements
of diffusion. The Vleberian model of bureaucracy stands as the
ideal-typical social setting within which Type 2 diffusion
can be maintained. The high degree of planning and contr. of
involved in the 'bureaucracy pe sAts a far clearer articulation
of the consequences of the process. This by no means implies,
however, that the process occurs exclusively iithin the organi-
zation: It can also be inter-organizational. Both individuals
and larger social units can be involved. For the sake of con-
venience, we designate Type 1 planned diffusion and Type 2
unplanned diffusion.
The two modes of diffusion are the polar extremes of a
continuum along which various modes of diffusion with different
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degrees of "plannedness" can be distinguished. Our interest in
planned change requires us, however, to attend to the issues
andproblems involved in modes of diffusion closer to the pole
of "planned diffusion"
The six major elements involved in planned diffusion
can be summarized in the following paridigm, which furnishes
the general framework for our analysis of the phenomena of








Briefly, the supra-agency plans and regulates the process
of adoption and diffusion and co-ordinates the innovations, the
clients--the targets of change, and .the change agents, who
mediate between the supra-agency and the clients and seek to
effect changes in the clients in a way that the supra-agency
5
desires. Whereas in unplanned diffusion the analyst has to
attend himself to the role of individual incentives in inno-
vation decision making* , the salient -issue raised by planned
diffusion concerns the question of the incentives which the
supra-agency can mobilize to involve both the clients and the
change agents in the process.' The answer to this question is
the formulation by the.. supra--agency of a power strategy'--the
systematic development and application of power means which
are designed to provide such incentives and thus to make the
supra-agency's control of the process possible. The focus is
on the supra-agency and its power strategy.
The change agent mediates himself to the clients and.
to the innovations through strategies of change. The degree
to which the process of diffusion is planned, the kind of power
strategy employed and the nature of innovations constitute
the '.'milieu of. .change agentry, which to a large extent shapes
the nature of strategies and tactics formulated by the change.-
agent in his direct participation. in innovation.. situations.
The organization of this paper is as follows:
Chapter One describes the ideological framework in terms
of which the Chinese Communists seek to encompass and analyse
*"The innovation-decision process is he mental process
through which andividual passes from first knowledge of an
innovation to a decision to adopt or reject and to confirmation
of this decision. See E.M. Rogers and F.F Shoema cer, Com iuni-
cation of Innovations (The Free Press, New York. Collier--Liac-
Millan Ltd. London: 971). -p.99.
6the phenomena of innovation diffusion. Assuming some relations
between ideology and planned action exist, the writer hopes
that this opening chapter may allow the reader to gain insight
into the power strategies and the strategies. of change developed
by the Chinese Communists. Chapter Two attempts to identify
the perceived attributes of agro-technical innovations in China.
Chapter Three develops a taxonomy of planned .diffusion and ex-
amines the way social conflicts become incorporated in.:planred
diffusion in- China. Chapter Four studies the role of the rural
cadres as change agent. In Chapter Five, we conclude by way of
summary with a Chinese model of innovation diffusion.
It is hoped that this study will not only throw light
on the nature and problems of plamied diffusion in Communist
China but also ferret out some of the dynamic strands of
socialist life in a country whose destiny may shape the world's
future.
No particul-arty compelling theoretical reason disposes
the writer to investions the diffusion of agro-technical as
opposed to other innovations in L9ainland China. The choice is
largely determined by the availability of empirical data.
Nevertheless, China' s struggle to. feed the world's largest
population in the countryside should be a cause si±ificant
enough to examine how, with feeble support from heavy industry7
and in the face of peasant conservatism and pragmriatism, China
attempts to foster agricultural development by intensively
utilizing local resources, through the generation and populari--
zation of agro--technical innovations of predominantly . experience-
changing kinds,
7CHAPTER I
INNOVATION DIFFUSION: THE CHINESE THEORY
Introduction
This chapter intends to describe how ideas contained
in the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party are used to
interpret the phenomena of. innovation diffusion in China. In
the light of the distinction drawn by Franz Schumann, these
ideas belong to a "pure" and a "practical" ideology: the former
providing "moral and ethical conceptions about right and wrong
and the latter stating rules which prescribe behavior and thus
are expected to have direct action consequences".l Assuming
some relations exists between ideology and action, these inter-
pretations may be regarded as constituting the framework which
maps reality and supplies meanings for purposeful action within
that reality. How these ideas become actually translated into
action is an empirical question which we do not intend to
tackle in this chapter. But we make the assumption that these
ideas may constrain the formulation of strategies of change
and thus are relevant to the understanding of planned diffusion
in Communist China.
Running through the Chinese understanding of innovation
diffusion are the central ideas of "contradictions" and "struggle,
8the former representing the Party's basic conception of the
nature of social life and the latter expressing both the value
and the means for attaining that value. The theory of contra-'
dictions posits that opposites exist in all kinds of things,
in people's thought, in social groups, and in the development
of all social processes. 2 Thus there are opposites between
the advanced"--the innovators and the early adopters of in-
novations -and' the backward!--the late adopters and laggards.*
There are "opposites" between the progressive and .:'the con-
servative, the "proletariat" and the capitalist, the "poor
and lower-middle peasants". These opposites often become
justaposed: innovativeness assumes a political character. Con--•
tradictions are salved, and have to be solved by struggles,
which range from vigorous debates and criticism to the use of
physical violence. Struggles re-establish the unity of the
'opposites".
True 11arxist--T eninists Must Use the Law of the Unity
of Opposites to Resolve Problems. 3 If this dictum in the Jen--
min jihpao is understood correctly as a Party instruction, it
would mean that strategies of change have to be formulated
"Everett Rogers and Shoemaker delineated five ijeal-
typical adopter categories, the classifications of the members
of a social system on the basis of their innovativeness--on. the
basis of. when they first begin adopting an inovation. These
five categories are :innovators, early adopters, early majority,
late majority and laggards. See E.L.Rogers and F.F. Shoemaker ,
Communication of inrovations (The Free Press, New York, Collier--
Macmillan Ltd. London, 1971), pp .183-185 .
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which incorporate the ideas of contradictions and struggle,,.
The planning of change becomes a process of analyzing the con-
tradictions between the advanced and the backward Y the
innovative' and the conservative and the progressive and
the regressive, seeing them systematically in polarized
categories of opposites, and consciously bringing about
struggles to solve the contradictions and re-establish unity.
The Chinese process of planned change in the diffusion of in-
novations, seen in sociological perspective, is one of inter-
preting, consciously bringing about, and solving social
conflicts.
10
Afro-techr_ical revolution: the actual iza-tion
of an objective historical necessity
Historical materialism posits that the contradiction
between relations of production and productive forces is the
incubator of social change. In the Preface to A Contribution.
to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx writes, At a
certain stage of their development, the material forces of
production in society come- in conflict with the existing re-
lations of production, or--what is but a legal expression for
the same thing--with the property relations within which they
had been at work before. From forms of development of the
forces of production these relations turn into their fetters.
Then occurs a per. iod of social revoli tion. With the change of
the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is
more or less transforryled." 4 In broad terms, history is the
development of contradictions within society and their re-
solution through- social conflicts. In his important passage,
On the correct handling of contradictions ar-n.ong the people",
written in 1957, Mao Tse-tung re--asserts this position: The
basic contradictions in socialist society are still those
between the relations of production and the productive forces
and between the superstructure and the economic base. 5,`1hereas
the development of history to the communist revolution is Le-
to the uncontrollable interplay of o i ective historical forces,
socialist society allows human beings, through collective
action, to consciously shape history in their interests by
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bringing relations of production and forces of production
under control. Social change assumes a planned character.
Whereas in capitalist society contradictions, which find ex-
pression in acute antagonism and conflicts and sharp class
struggles, cannot be solved by the capitalist system itself
and can only be resolved by socialist revolution, in the
socialist society they are, Mao maintains, not antagonistic
and can be resolved one after another by the socialist system
itself. 6 This is achieved by two means: by handling con-
tradictions among the people and by developing the productive
forces.
By the end of 1952, China had succeeded in liquidating
the old rural gentry and re--distributing the bulk of landlord-
and rich peasant land.? Land. reform, however, did not relieve
the overall agricultural situation. To meet the problem of
increased need for agricultural production, Peking launched
into. full-scale programs of 'cr eating co-operatives. In a
period of two years, 97 percent of peasant households were
incorporated into Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives, among
which 96 percent belonged to the Higher-stage APC's in which
peasant property were completely socialized. 8
What this means, in terms of Ideology, is a basic trans-
formation in production relations, creating contradictions
between old productive forces and new production relations.
The contradiction has to be solved by a revolution within the
forces of production.
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Agro--technical innovations are the answer to cne neea,
as a theoretical passage in Xin jianshe claims, "The socialist
revolution was instigated and developed within the institution
of private property which set limitations on agricultural
productivity. The victory of the' socialist revolution creats
favourable conditions for the development of productive forces
and presses for increasing production to relieve the economic
situation. A technological revolution in agricultural pro-
duc tion is the solution to this very problem. Only on the bases
of liberated productive forces and liberated thought and only
through e« eriments and collective efforts, however, can this
revolution be ultimately promoted into a high-tide of nation-
wide technological upheavals. Given the under-development of
industry in our country, such an agro--teci-nical revolution
is inevitably one with primary stress on revolutionizing pro-
duction experiences and only secondarily on innovations in
agricultural tools in cases where they are needed. Depending
on the perf orma.ric e . o f industry, the agro-technical revolution
will definitely develop within a certain period of time into
one embodying mechanization. This is the dialectical process
of the nation-wide revolution." 9
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Agro-technical innovations precipitate
contradiction s a]nong the people
Agro-technical revolution allows men to relate them-
selves more effectively to nature. But the nature to which
men relate themselves in agricultural production is socialized
nature and the main corpus of agricultural production is man..
It follows that the process of agro-technical revolution cannot
be dissociated from social relations ....When innovations come
on the scene, they definitely will not be promptly accepted
by habits and conventions. instead of withdrawing, they will
cause disturbances, make noise, and assert for themselves the
right of existence. Opposites between the new and the old, the
advanced and the backward, the progress promoting and the re-
trogression-promoting are as a result precipitated. Innovations
are brought in by contradictions. They in turn create contra-
dictions among the people which have to be solved. For this
reason, the iberation of thought is actually a process in whirethe _
contradictions- of thought emergent from the agro--technical
revolution are resolved. 10 The process by which innovations
get adopted is a process in which the thought* of 'the con-
servative" and. the backward is liberated --their -.subjective
initiative becomes actualized. The whole process would "strengtnhen
men's collective prowess in the struggle against nature".11
* Thought refers here to the manner of thinking
characteristic of an individual. The word szuhsiang-is often
rendered as "ideology"tin English translation. See F. Schumann,
Ideology and Organization in Communist China (University of
California Press, 1971),p.30-31
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These contradictions among the people, the passage
carefully specifies, are "social contradictions among the
people themselves" and not 'social contradictions between
j ourselves and the enemies, and as such have to be handled
differently." 'Social contradictions between ourselves and
the enemies' have basically been solved with the transformation
in production relations and with the political and ideological
Tictories of the socialist revolution. 'Social contradictions
among the people themselves' have to be correctly handled to
thoroughly liberate the people's thought and resolve the
ideological contradictions between 'progress promotion' and
'retrogression promotion'.12 Whereas dictatorial methods
are applied on the enemies, democratic methods are used to
resolve social contradictions among the people themselves."13
Persuasion, not compulsion, is the correct strategy. The
democratic method of persuasion is articulated in the formula:
"Unity-Criticism-Unity. To elaborate, it means starting from
the desire for .unity, resolving contradictions through criticism
or struggle and arriving at a new unity on a new basis."14
Tactics of criticism and struggle include taming tafang ta-
pienlun tatzupao,which literally means the airing of one's
views, the contending and debating to the fullest extent and
the publizing of one's views in wall newspapers.
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Innovativeness
Innovativeness reflects the degree to which one's
thought is advanced or backward. People with advanced thought",
notes one writer, will become pace-makers in production and
innovators of farming experiences and techniques. People with
"beclard. thought", on the other hand, are more easily trapped
by old experiences'.15
Whether one's thought is advanced or backward is re-
lated to one's socialist consciousness, as the FZinis ter of
Agriculture observed in 1959, The conservatism in agro-technical
revolution is as a rule related to the conservatism in the
question about the speed of socialist construction. It is
frequently associated with the fact that people's thought is
not yet ready for the socialist revolution."16 Ideological
backwardness may present itself in different forms of political
deviation: right conservatism, which is recognized as a con-
tradiction" among,r the people themselves", and right opportunism",
which is a contradiction between ourselves and the enemies.
Ideological backwardness cc-in also be a reflection of the "capi-
talist thought inthe individual, in which case the contradiction.
precipitated among the people becomes one between "the prole-
tariat and the capitalist class. Innovation diffusioa becomes
a process in which contradictions between the two classes are
created and resolved through class struggles".
When innovativeness reflects the degree of socialist
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consciousness, the logic follows that the poor and lower-
middle peasants are more innovative than the rich middle
peasants.* Both the poor peasants and the lower strata of the
new and old middle peasants are,, Mao says, enthusiatic about
the socialist road and are eagerly responding to our Party's
call for co_operativization--this being particularly the case
among those with a higher level of political consciousness---
ecause the poor peasants are in a difficult econ.omi.c position
and because the lower middle peasants are still not well off,
although their economic position is better than before liber-
ation."17 The rich middle peasants, on the other hand, observed .
the First Secretary of Dwwangtu.1g, .resisted the series of
technological innovations organized around close planting."
The reason was, Technological revolution involves not only.
technology .but also serious ideological struggles.18 The
identification of the differential innovativeness of social
classes in the countryside allows, as vie will make clear in
later chapter. s, the Party to select its social.point of entry
into the village in the planning of change.
A document written by Lao Tse-tung in October 1933
differentiated five social classes in the rural areas in terms
of their status of Sand- hoidings : Lhe landlord, the rich peasants,
the middle peasants, the poor peasants and the workes,See
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking:Foreign Languages Press;
1967)I,pp.137-139,The land reform "had not noly destroyed the
landlord class and greatly weakened the rich peasants economically,
but politically had decidively overthrown the landlord class
and isolated the rich peasants". See Liu Shao-ch'i's rcport to
the Eighth party Congress,Jenmin shouts's 1957,p.ll. The classi-
fication system was preserved, howwber, even after communization
It was warned, for example,in a pamphlet that"the overthrown
landlords and rich peasants are never rconciled to their doom
and are always attempting a come-back",(The Struggle Between
The Two Roads In China's Countryside,Peking, Foreign Language
press,p.23)Middle and poor peasants are ascribe class membership.
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The complementarity of the processes of
innovation o,nd diffusion
The process of agro-technical development, the Chinese
theory recognizes, contains the bipartite process of 'televatbion
-the creation of more advanced farming techniques and experiences
--and popularization.
These two processes are interdependent and mutually re-
enforcing. Elevation, in-itself, contributes to popularization.
.The latter, in itself, contributes to elevation. This is clearly
spelled out in a theoretical passage: And also, the process of
the creation and extension of advanced experiences is ...at the
same time a.process of popularization and elevation. For once
the advanced experiences are created they set up targets for
emulation. Criticizing backwardness and empiricism, they help
the backward to move up to the level attained by the advanced.
As the 'dowT,rnstream' and 'middle stream' are surging up, the
advanced are comnell ed to strive for yard to achieve even higher
standards. As a matter of fact,.advanced experiences can enrich
and improve itself by learning from the experiences of other
districts and production units and by making improvements trough
continuous practice. The process of the popularization of ad-
vanced experiences is hence also a process of elevation. "19
'Popularization is justified not merely because the back ai d"
become advanced in the course of the process but also because
favorable conditions are created for further elevation.
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CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF INNOVATIONS
Introduction
The process of social change, as we asserted. before, - in--
wolves the bipartite process of the adoption. and diffusion of an
innovation. Numerous empirical.. findings appear to suggest that
the attributes of an innovation as perceived by the potential
`adopter are directly related to its rate of adoption.' It is
widely supported by empirical findings, for example, that the
attributes of "relative advantage", 'compatibility"(wrath socio-
cultural values and beliefs, with previously introduced ideas and
with client needs), trialability and observability are posi-
tively related to the rate of adoption of an innovation. 2 Given
this strategic place of the attributes of innovations in the
process of adoption and diffusion, it would be of practical sig-
nificance for the change agent to identify the perceived attributes
of an innovation in the forrrlulation of change strategies and tactics,
as Zaltrnan and Lin perceptively point out :" Strategies and tactics
of planned interventation must consider explicitly the nature of
innovations. To the extent that the attributes of innovations are
manipulable, they are important to.the change agent as entry
points into the social change process. Thus two steps are in-
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volved.. The first is to determine. current or most probable per-
ceptions of 'the 'innovation. The next step is, where necessary,
to alter the attributes of the innovation thereby or the per-
ception of them. In doing so, the change agent is controlling
the most . fundamental elements in the social change process, the
social change object itself."3 We basically accept this position
in.the development-in later chapters of the thesis that the. mani-
pulation of the attributes of agro-technical innovations repre-
sents an' Important dimension of.change agentry in Communist China.
We are concerned in this chapter with determining and delineating
the most probable perceived attributes of agro-technical which
come under the rubric of the Eight Point Charter, on the prin-
ciples of which agricultural development since 1958 has been based.
The main directions for China's. agro--technical develop-
ment were formulated as early as 1957 in a document drafted by
Mao Tse-tung himself : Revised Draft Program On Agricultural De-
velop went In The Nation, .1956-1967 . 5 The Program, it was stated,
shall be a program of struggle during the period of our country's
first, second and third rive Year Plans with a view to developing
rapidly the agricultural production force so as to strengthen
socialist industrialization and to raise the living standards of
the peasants as well as of the entire people. 6 The main domains
of agro--technical activities in which innovations were to be
generated and popularized were clearly specified in the Chapter
four of the Program. Twelve production-increasing measures were
listed: There axe two main ways to increase the yield of crops :
taking steps to increase production and disseminatin advanced
experiences. The chief measure to increase production are: water
20
,conservancy projects increase of fertilizers use of improved
tools and gradual introduction of modern implements; extension
of multiple croping areas planting more high-yield crops in-
tensive farming and improving farm methods soil improvement
water ana soil conservation protecting and breeding draft ani-
imals wiping out insects pests and plant diseases and opening
up virgin and waste 'land and extending cultivated areas. 7 The
main strategy for agricultural development, it was apparent, did
not rely on mechanization. The final version was hammered out,
it appeared, after much "struggle" and debate among the policy-
makers. The Vice-minister of "Agriculture, Liu Shui-lung stated
the major arguments involved: After the land reform was con-
summated, questions of these kinds have been raised: On what
basis can production be elevated? Can production be increased by
relying entirely on conventional agricultural techniques? In
what ways can we exploit favourable conditions created in the
land reform for furthering agricultural production? Some seeked
answer in mechanization instead of in co-operativization. Given
practical limitations in our resources, mechanization was not
going to be possible. As a' matter of fact, it was futile to sit
waiting for mechanization and delaying co-operativization. This
position was castigated. The Party center and Comrade Mao Tse-
tung point out : Taking into account. the practical conditions in
our country, we have to undergo co-operativization first before
bigger machines can be adopted. Until mechanization was possib ,
we have to fully utilize favourable conditions created by co-
operativization, popularize advanced experiences, renovate,
21
farming techniques and promote production. Increase in agricultural
1production. accumlul .tes capital for industrial development and
furnishes the pre-conditions for agricultural mechanization. We
will not entertain the empty delusion of mechanization. We are
determined to Walk the road of getting organized, seriously im-
f plementing various production-increasing measures and enhance
production."8 The final victory. of Mao and his group implied not
only that the agricultural development program relying basically
on mechanization was to go ,into banishment, but also that social
mobilization, which was made possible now by the radical trans-
formation of organizational life in the village that ensued from
co-operativization, was to be adopted as the main strategy for
promoting agro-technical development of a nation-wide scale.
In 1958, Mao Tse--tung summarized the twelve production-
increasing measures into the "Eight Point Charter For Agriculture"
deep ploughing and soil improvement, heavy fertilization, water
conservancy, seed selection, close planting, plant protection,
field management and repair of tools. The Charter fon ulated the
frameworf for agricultural development and agro-technical inno-
vations, as Liu Shui-lung the Vice-minister of Agriculture ob-
served, "The implementation of the Eight Point Charter For Agri-
culture is requisitive for agro-technical revolution in-our
country."9 The endorse gent of the Eight Point Charter indicated
also that social mobilization as a strategy for agro-technical
development was to be pursued.
This thesis is about the diffusion of agro-technical in-
novations-contained in the Eight Point Charter.
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A heuristic model of innovation attributes
Notwithstanding the central significance of innovation
attributes in the process of planned change, no serious attempt
has as yet been undertaken to-delineate a theoretically satis-
factory comprehensive schema that can systematically describe
the perceived attributes of innovations in universal terms.lO
- Rogers' , and more elaborated, Zaltman and Lin' s contribution
in this regard are far from satisfactory.* This section is in-
tended to develop a conceptual schema that can afford the
greatest generality in encompassing and describing the attri-
butes of innovations. Hopefully, it may enable us to identify
the attributes of innovations in Communist China and, in later
chapters, to discover the relations between the attributes of
these innovations and the strategies of change formulated.
One important first step in this direction is to see
the innovation in context. The basic position is to insist
*Rogers and Shoemaker delineate.- the attributes of
relative advantage.compatibility, complexity, trialability
and observability. Zaltman and Lin give a more impressive list:
terminality reversibility, divisibility, the degree of com-
mitment required, publicness and privateness, number of gate-
keepers i-rivolved, number of nodes in the inriovati on' s passage
through the social system, susceptibility to successive modi-
fications, gatewayability(opening avenues to other adoptions)
and ego-involvement. See Rogers and Sy oem-iiaker, Communicat ion
of Innovations (The Free Press, New York: Collier-haclnillan Ltd.
Bondon,1971) pp.136-171 And see Zaitr an and Lill, On the nature
of innovations , American Behavioral Scientist, XIV no.5. (May--
June 1971)Pp.663-668
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that the innovation does not exist in isolation. As does the
individual, the innovation is embedded ' in social and cultural
contexts, which constrain and shape the perception of the in-
novation by the individual. There are, for this reason, not
only perceived intrinsic attributes -- ,tlhat constitute the
substantive embodiments of the innovation--but also perceived
"contextual attributes, which have their sources in the social
and cultural contexts. W:thin this latter category, two distinct
orders of attributes can be distinguished: normative attributes,
which have as their origins the common value and norms embodied
in a culture or subculture, and social attributes, which
bear the features of the contextual social structure and social
organization. Moving through different social and culture
contexts, the same innovation. may for this reason be described
in texas of different social and normative attributes.-
The delineation of the probable perceived attributes of
an innovation with the help of these conceptual devices cons-
titutes, hov:ever, only the first step in the study of planned
change. The next step is to establish the relations between
the attributes and the strategies and tactics devel oped.ll
The main corpus of this attempt is contained in the next two
chaptFrs. To the extent that normative attributes are mani-
pulable, they become important entry points for the supra-
agency applying a normative power strategy , which attempts
to systematically motivate and involve the clients in the
planned diffusion of innovations by the systematical allocation
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of symbolic power means. Since normative power depends on the
manipulation of symbols and "meanings" it would require also
the supra-agency to represent the innovations, through mani-
pulating the "normative" attributes, to the clients in a
meaningful perspective.
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The attributes of afro-technical info-
vations in Communist China
Agro-technical innovations encompassed within the
Eight Point Charter may be characterized in terms of two
distinct orders of attributes: intrinsic attributes, which
are intrinsic to the substantive embodiment of the innovations,
and contextual attributes, which have their sources in the
ideology of the Chinese Communist Party and the social structure
and social organization of Communist Chinese society. We
describe the normative attributes, the social attributes and
the intrinsic attributes in turn.
1. Normative attributes
"Advancedness" Innovations are not merely "new"
practices, ideas, or material artifacts. They are "advanced
experiences", hence desirable to be adopted. The Vice-minister
of Agriculture observes, The masses are already in possessi on
of very rich production-increasing experiences. From now on,
moreover, in the comprehensive process of bringing off the
Eight Point Charter, many more near .experiences will continuously
be created. The careful summarization and popularization of
such advanced experiences will be extremely useful to the
promotion of agricultural production, the development of the
Eight Point Charter, and the elevation of standards in agri--
cultural sciences."(underline added)12To adopt innovations
is to be on the advanced, progressive - side of social
contradict ions.
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Authoritativeness Innovations are authoritative
because they are formulated by Mao Tse-tung and promulgated
by the Party. A passage in Hungchi , for example, opens its
paragraph by making direct attribution to Chairman Mao : "The
'Eight Point Charter'--soil, fertilizer, water, seeds, close-
planting,plant protection, field management, tools--formulated
by our great leader Chairman Mao himself scientifically sums.
up practical experiences in our country's agricultural pro-
duction and cogently demonstrates the objective laws in agri-
cultural production. It is a great programme for scientific
fairing."13The authoritativeness of the Eight Point Charter
constitutes a resource in terms of which innovations can
claim legitimacy.
Sianificance The adoption of innovations
contained in the Eight Point Charter is.meaningful not-only
in terms of increasing production but also in terms of larger
purposes and higher goals. Lu Hsiang' s passage in Hungchi
articulates this positiion. "The 'Eight Point Charter'in
agriculture is a grand pro ramme for achieving greater, faster,
better, and more economic results in developing socialist
agriculture on the basis of collectivization. Following
Chairman Mao' s revolutionary line and the series of general
and specifs.c policies, seriously implementing the 'Eight Point
Charter' , capturing stable and high yield and consolidating
the agricultural base will be of fundamental significance to
the development of the entire national economy. Then agri-
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culture thrives, socialist revolution and the enterprise 01
socialist construction can make big strides forvvard. The dictator-
ship of tie pmoletariat can then be much more consolidated. We
must thoroughly understand the significant implications of
carrying through the' Eight Point Charter' in the light of the
-importance of agriculture.... Only. when we cherish the ideolog
of farming for the revolution and understand the implementation
of the Charter in terms of seizing high yields, accelerating
socialist revolution and socialist construction, consolidating
the dictatorship of the proletariat and supporting world revo-
lutionary causes can we stand higher, see farther; set ambitious
goals and attempt by all available means to promote local agri--
cultural production. 11-4 The significance attribute of the
innovations can also take on more specific political impli-
cations. Referring to the right opportunist , the Nice-minister
of agriculture observed in 1.959, The struggle for defending
the Eight Point Charter in agriculture is actually a struggle
for defending the Party's general line of .socialist construction,
for defendin the. great leaping for%rard in agricultural pro-
auction and for de f ending the People's C orsmurne."15
Political risk 'Whether to adopt the Eight Point
Charter or not carries an element of political risk.As a
hsien Party cormittee in Arhw i puts it. To implement or
not to implement the Eight Point Charter in agriculture re-
flects the struggles between the two lines. Whether the Eight
Point Charter is correctly implemented is also a matter of
the struggle between the two lines."16 As early as 1963, Nao
has already "pointed out to the whole Party" that 'class
struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experi-
ment are the three great revolutionary movements for building
a mighty socialist country",17 Among its many implications,
the slogan clearly indicates that political activities cannot
be divorced from the domain of production activities: there
are political struggles in production activities. Mao's
dictum was echoed by Chen Yung-kwei , Tachai Brigade's First
Secretary, Chairman Mao' s 'Eight Point Charter' reveals the
objective law in the development of socialist agriculture. To
rapidly transform our agriculture, we must espouse this road,
Deceivers of Liu Shao-ch' i' s kind eschew the Charter. The
ulterior purpose is to disrupt and undermine the revolutionary
line of Chairman i`[ao. To develop our socialist agriculture,
the cadres and members of Hsiyang hsien and Tachai Brigade
have decided to respond to Chair an : ao' s great call in
'Grasp revolution: prormote production' a .d seriously put into
practice the 'Eight Point Charter' in agriculture."18
Compatibility with ideolo gical canons Dictuns
expressing va:!_ues and norms contained in the ideology of the
Chinese Communist Party, may affect the ways the innovations
are perceived. One important change agent role of the cadre,
we believe, is the meaningful- interpretation of an innovation
situation in terms of these ideological canons.
(1) "Grasp? revolution promote pro ducti on : Production-
increasing innovative measures become justified if they are
for the cause of "revolution". Innovations can be sanctioned
if the are just for the sake of "production"--the mistake
of "Production first" and "Technique first". The porcess
involved in ideological legitimization is interestingly re-
lated in a passage witten by party cadres in a production
brigade in anhwei:"In august 1971. out leading cadres were
organizing study-groups for a rectification when it was re-
ported that more than a thousand acres of water paddy and
cotton were seriously infected with insects. the worried
poor and lower-middle peasants requested the cadres to launch
an anti-insect campaign. Afraid of committing the mistake of
'allowing production to obstruct politics'. some cadres
hesitated. The looming seriousness of the disaster finally
changed our mind. We moved int the field and organized the
masses to fight the pest. Later, we gathered the cadres and
the masses to study chairman Mao's teaching concerning 'ideo-
logical work and political work are the guarantees for the
accomplishment of economic and tecihnological tasks. they
are for the service of the ceonomic base;' and 'it must be
done together with economic tasks and cannot be left alone."19
(2)"Hount indigenous methods. "combine indigenous
ways with foreign ways. "Use antiquities for present purposes"
adopt foreign things to se4rve chinese needs. "Do The best
according to local conditions." these ideological canons
may affect the ways peasants perceive the "origins" of inno-
vations. while "doing the best according to local conditions"
recommends the adortion of indigenous innovations, foreign
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innovations can also be justified in terns of the other two
ideological dictums.
(3)"Foreigners' vassal philosophy.""The line of
ex .ertise. I'Material stimulus. Economics takes compand"
Ideological canons are also phrased in negative terns. over-
reliance on foreign innovations and technological expertise
and over-emphasizinh the use of material incentives and
profits the violate Avalues and norms contained in the ideology
of the Chinese Communist Party.
2. Social attributes
Economic risk Collectivization eases. the risks in-
volved in adopting innovations with which peasants are un--
familia.r and are likely to bungle on their first trial. Eco--
nomic cost becomes less formidable when shared by the collecti-
vity than b r the individual peasant household2° Innovations
come to acquire, however, the attribute of collective econo-
mlic risk: the cost hn.s to be paid bvr the collectivity. On this
factor, Chen Yung-kwei observes, "Is it mistmusting science to
subject every item to test? Is it mistrusting other people?
No. This is a scientific attitude, a respohsible spirit. It is
comp, ete thoughtlessness to adopt, apply and popularize every
kind of experience. Now that we are doi lcollective economay,
such an attitude would result in unnecessary loss to the col--
lectivi ty. For this reason, vie. have been insisting for more
than ten years on testing innovations on small plots, and ex--
21tensively popularizing them. afterward Innovative measures
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which benefit the collective economy may not necessarily,
however, be benefiting the individual household. There is, to
the latter, a different risk element in the adoption of these
innovations. A Tachai story describes a case in which the
brigade members resisted the innovation of bean-maize alternate-
row planting. Formmerly, Tachai rave 20 to 30 percent of the fields
to beans, which were directly accred to the peasants. The total-
food." output, which was accrued to the collectivity, was decreased
however, by that amount. The innovative measure was meant to
step up total "food" yield by plan tiny, bean and maize together.
The innovation ion was succestul and "both collective savings and
beans shared among the members increased." 22 Individual risk
is not, because of collectivization, Eliminated.
Status risk For systematically motivating and
involving peasants in the planned diffusion of innovations,
China has by means of a positive strategy of conflict--
emulation campaign, elaborated a comprehensive system of
scial differentiation which distributes prestige-status to
inrolved competitors in the emula.ti on cammpnaign. (Chapter III),
The downward disolaccment of status-incumbents in the system
of status differentiation creates a social attribute of
status risk" in an innovation. A report in Jennin jihpao
described how some peasants perceived the attribute of status
sik:" in an innovative measure which increased wheat acreage.
Some members objected to the innovation on the ground that
We are inexperienced in planting wheat. If this resulted in
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a drop in the total yield, Tachai can no longer preserve its
advanced status."23 It seems plausible that he higher is the
prestige-status of a production unit, the greater is the
"status risk" contained in an innovation.
Structural radicalness Structural radicalness
refers to the degree to which an innovation may bring about
alterations in such basic structural elements as communication,
authority, and reward sjstem, 24 Agro-technical innovations in
China, it appears, are structurally radical with regard to
two sets of structural elements: (1) the authority of the
old peasants and (2) the economic position of the"rich middle
peasants".
(I) After the land reform, the old peasants were
still able to maintain their authority among the rmiddle-aged
peasants. In Chekiang, it was thus reported: "'Whose opinion
do the members revere most in matters concerning production?'
the cadre of the Agriculturai Bureau and the agro-technical
station asked the cadre of the co-operative. The latter answered,
'Members move thirty are most ready to listen to the old
peasants.' After consulting the cld peasants, the cadre pro-
ceeded to extend close-planting in the villae , The members of
the co-operative said, 'The old peasants cannot be wrong be-
cause they are so experienced.' The extension of close-planting
met with no resistance."25 The authority of the old peasants
was necessarily undermined when innovations embodying, modern
scientific knowledge were introduced. Their resistance to
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these innovations is also understandable, Many instances of
conflict between the old peasants and the younger peasants
and cadres were reported. A commen tary in Chengch'ih hseuhshih
contaatins this report:; "They (the younger peasants and cadres)
regard new techniques as advanced and scientific and old ways
of farming as 'backward', even' superstious, No co-existence
with the 'old' could be tolerated, Rudeness to the old peasants
and disrespect towards their experiences is prevalent,"26 To
adsorb the conflict and to illicit the support of the old
peasants, bbarious mechanisms were arranged to directly involve
the old peasants in decision-making activties, The commcontary
cotinues," old peasant advisory quaarters were set up in many
districts, Panels of old peasants were periodically convened,
They were consulted before any important technological innovation
was introduced,"27 "Triple combinations'--committees represented
by cadres, young pessants ans old peasants--were later more
widely established to formalize their relations in the process
of innovation.
(2) Agro-technical innovations appear also to be
structurally radical in the way they serve to dislocate the
"rich middle peasants"from their positions of econmic pro-
minence in the village, Their economec positions are sustained.
it appears, by their skillful mastery of farmicg techniques
When innovations are introduced, they lose the ground of economic
power, A report from the shuntak shien in the province of
kwangtung described in fact how the "poor and lower-middle
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peasants" broght the "rich middle peasants"down from lesdership
positions in the instruction of farming techniques in t he village
and in this way cleared the way for inovations.28
3.Intrinsic attributes
Testability Whether an innovation can be teated
may affect its adoption for tworeasons:(1)innovations which
are viable elsewhere may not be suitable for local soil, geo-
graphical and manpower conditions;(2)rash adoption and ex-
tensive popularization contarins a large element of collective
economic risk. This is particularly the casewith improved
seed strains, Tacharicapproach to the adoption of noe seed
strains is in this respect typical;"Good seed strains are
not good everywhere. Comrade Chen Yung-kwei often says,'Seed
strains are only relatively good!' They are,Seed sstrains that
are good somewhere may not be good elsewhere because soil
and climatic conditions vary from one place to another, Bad
seed strains may become good seed strains when the environment
changes.It is mistaken to believe that the seed strains which we
obtain through exchange from other places are necessarily good.
We will suffer if they are blindly popularized, When introducing
seed starains from outside,Tachai always tost them on test-
plots and widel extend them only arter they have satisfied
teh tesa,"29 Tachai's attitudo towardas innovations is generally
onen of subjccting them to test befroe sdopting them,"Testability"
Becomes an important attribute,
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1 Demonstrability "The peasants are prateatists.
They value concrete exaruples and solid results. They are very
practical."30 The peasants need to be demonstrated the effectiveness
of an innovation to be convinved. Tachai's reports contain a
case in which the peasants resisted deep ploughing in maize.
Resenting the measure, they ploughed holes which were seven
to ei ht inches deeper than the standard measure. They were
convinced of deep-ploughang, however, when, after a heavy
shower, the plants grew much better. The ploughed holes were
able to keep the rain--water. "Before they ever practiced
deep-pioughin, it was difficult to have them convinced,
After they have actually tried it, and witnessed the results,
we cannot even ask them to stop deep-plaugiiing"31 Whether




PLANNED DIFFUSION: TOWARD A CHINESE MOEL OF
INNOVATION DIFFUSION
Introduction
The diffusion of agro-technical innovations in China
became from 1957 onward consciously planned and controlled.
The general program of planned diffusion. was .formulated. by
Mao Tse-tung in the document, "Revised Draft Program On Agri-.
cultural Development In The Nation, 1956--1967 : "The chief
steps to popularize advanced. experiences include the following:
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions shoul--d collect
data on the experiences of local cooperatives in increasing
yields, compile them, and publish them in print, so as to
s-oread this . knowl edge as widely as possible agricultural
exhibitions conferences of model peasants called at.regular
intervals by governments of various levels, with awards and
citations to peasants who distinguish themselves in increasing
production mutual visits and emulation campaigns between co-
oneratives to exchange experience for higher production im-
parting technical knowledge and encourging peasants and cadres
to learn the advanced administrative experiences and technical
knowledge of other hsiang, other hsien, and other provinces
(autonomous regions)." 1 Tire, 'arty and the Government were
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to consciously assume the role of the supra-agency--co-ordinating
and regulating the process of diffusion. This was supported
by the establishment of a collective economy in the village
in 1957, The amalgamation of 97 percent of the peasant houase-
holds into seven hundred and fifty two thousand co-opcratives2
created a system in which"everything was now to be done through
rational organization"3 and in which "Party-led movements an
campaigns became a regular feature of village life."4
The application of movements and campaigns to the or-
ganization of village activtes was develooped, however, as
early as 1944, during the Yenan Peridod(1935-46), The Party's
approach to the village was brought out clearly in an article
written in 1944:"One must use the methods of appeals and
mobilization through administrative power from the top down.
But one must crcate a degree of volition and freedom on the
part of the masses. If one only uses administrative power, then
one cannot consolidate the system. But only to emphasize voli-
tion and frecdom, and not to make use of appcals and mobilization
through strong administration, to organize positvely,means
that work will degenerate into laissez-faire,"5 Though the
Party appealed to the cadres to "create a degree of volition
and freedom" on the part of the peasants, it was apparrent that
the preeminent feature of its rural straategy was the use of
organization and mobilization. As an important facet of agri-
cultural development, the diffusion of agro-technical inno-
vations was not to be left unploanned,"Leadership in the move-
ment for the innovation of agricultual tools should combine
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innovative creation with popularization, propagatiion with
application elevation with popularization-and strong politi-
cal leadership with comprehensive meticulous organizational
work"6.Collectivization meant, however, not only that village
activities were planned and organized but also that collective
goal-oriented activities became now possible and meaningful.
This was recognized by a theoretical passage written in 1959:
"The new socialist production relations are relations of pro-
duction unified and united on the basis of collective ownership.
On such basis relations among people come to share factors of
common interest. Production activities and agro-technical in-
novations can more easily be co-ordinated. This is the realistic
basis of our mass-line, the basic spirit of-which is the spirit
of collectivism. The masses organized under the rubric of such
a line are organized masses. Through organization, the power
of the masses attains a transformation in quality. The sheer
volume of the people involved, plus common objectives, co-
ordinated effort and collective .wisdom transform the masses
into an all-mithty force. For this reason, agro-technical
revolution is by its nature and scope necessarily a movement
of immense expanse and intense ma tude. "7
When agricultural productivity became the concern of the
collectivity, agro-technical innovations changed from being the
privately owned economic means harboured by individual peasant
households into a public resource. For the interests of the
collectivity their generation and.extension had to be planned
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and organized. Compring the situation in China with what he
regarded as the situation in capitalist society, a commertor
in hsuehhsi argued for the planned dissemination of agro-technial
innovatios,"If we compare the conditions in capitalist socxety
with what we have in our coutry, it is obvious that the re-
lations between advanced and backward production units and the
processes by which advanced frming techniques and experiences
are popularized are dissimilar, Advanced farming experiences
and farming techniques in our country are no longer he instru-
mentality controlled by a minority to tealize extra profits.
They are no longer secretly kept and monoplkized, They are
mastered, on the contrary, with the purpose of more speedily
constructing socialism. Their introduction and popularization
are for this reason consciously organized and planned, More
backward production units will not noly not be displaced and
expelled by the advanced production units, but will also
obtain their support,"8 The Party and Government, in other
words, would have to co-ordinate and involve production units
in the active sharing and exchange of agro-technical innovations.
While formerly economic self-interests supplied the main
source of incentives for the individual peasant households in
undertaking agro-technical innovations, the new system of
collective ownershio had to provede new incentives in terms
of which peasants might be motivated to adopt innovations for
the les direct purpose of improving the econmic performance
of the collectivity. Administrative directives supported by
coercion alone were not adequate for the purpose,As Mao
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observer,"In any kind of work that requires the masses to
involve and participate, their consciousness and eagerness is
prerequisite,For otherwise it will degenerate into formalism
and failure,"9 The system of new incentives have to come from
ideology, which provides norms and values through which indi-
viduals are motivated to give full commitment to the Party,10
In other words, moral instesd of material incentives have to
be used, Much debate over the policies for developing agri-
culture was in fact going on within the Poliburo in mid 1957
between a radical group headed by Mao and a more moderate
group headed by Ch'en Yun, The former advocated a policy of
social mobilizaton in order to achieve rapid economic growth,
relying chiefly on motivation based on ideologifcal values, The
latte advocated a policy of material incentives in order to
achieve a more balanced, though slower, economic growth.11
Early in October, Mao's group had won out in the Poliburo.12
Agro-technical development was to be rapidly pushed forward
using social mobilization andmoral incentives,Rhe victory
of Mao's group also settled the direction of administrative
decentralization."Politics Takes Command": administrative powers
in the production units were vested completely in the hands of
teh Party committees.13 Ideology was in full swing.
The Great Leap Forward in 1958, which saw the most extreme
aplication of the mobilizational approach, failed fdisastrously,
Rhough a policy of liberalization gradually set in to repair
the wreck, the use of ideology as the source of moral incentives
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was never abandoned. The socialist reeducation movement in the
village (1962-65) savt- the re-burgeoning-of a mobilizational
approach.14 The mass movement to learn from Tachai, launched
in 1964,' is still the driving motif of agricultural production.*
The collapse of Liu aha.o--ch' i in the Cultural Revolution announced
.the formal ascendancy of ideology. Politics resumed command.
To briefly summarize the main ideas contained in these
pages: The diffusion of E.gro--technical innovations in Communist
China was consciously planned and co--ordinated by the Party and
Government. Administrative powers were combined with strategies
aiming at illiciting the eagerness and consciousness of the
peasants. Our next concern is to develop a conceptual scheme
that may be r deq_u ,te for the interpretation of these strategies.
Tachai is a production brigade in the mountain area
of the north China province of Shansi. Led by its Party branch,
the brigade has built a village x hich was very poor before liber-
ation, ' ir_to a thriving new socialist country. It has done this
by persisting in putting proletarian politics in cor rand, edu--
eating the peasants in Mao T setung Thought 5 firmly taking the
socialist road and adhering to the principle of self--reliance
and hard work. The road of Tachai is the road pointed out by
Chairman I- ao for develoDin g China's socialist agriculture. In
1964 Chairman Mao issued the great call: 'In agriculture,learn
from Tachai.. His call vi-as followed by a vigorous countryside
movement to learn from the Tachai Brigade, and resulted in
rapid expansion-.of China's agriculture. See T acha-i Standa rd
Bearer in China's Agriculture (Peking: Foreign Language Press,
1972)
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Toward a taxonornj of p fanned diffusion
The central issue addressed to the supra-agency which
plans and co-ordinates the process of diffusion is: how can
it systematically motivate and involve the clients and the
change agents in the process of planned diffusion? how can
it assure that its directives are complied? The issue has a
motivational and a structural aspect: motivational, since it
concerns the commitment of the involved participants to the
supra-agency structural, .since it concerns the kinds and.
distribution of power by means of which the supra-agency
supports its directives. What features "planned" as opposed
to unplanned diffusion is its stress on "compliance", which
refers to a relationship consisting of the power employed by
superiors to control subordinates and the orientation of the
subordinates to this power."15 The supra-agency, in other words,
is concerned with enlisting the participants' commitment by
systematically manipulating power means which are.appr_ opriate
for the relationships of compliance.
Depending on the rreans(symbolic means, material means,
physical means) employed to make the participants comply, three
kinds of power can be distinguished: normative power, which is'
based on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards
The perspectives aevelopea 3.n cnls seetilon are
borrowed substantially from Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative
Annlysis of Complex Organizations (The Free Prss, New
York:Collier-Macmillan Ltd.,London,1961)
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and deprivations; remunerative power, which is based on the
control over material resources; and coercive power, which
rests on the application, ro the threat of application, of
physical sanctions.16 There are, as Etzioni distinguishes,
two kinds of normative powerbased on the manipulation
of esteem, prestige, and ritulistic symbols, and the other
on the allocation and manipulation of acceptance and positive
response.17
The orientation of the subordinated actors--their
"involvement"--to the power can be characterized as either
postitive--"commitment"--or negative-"alienation".Positive
commitment of high intensity can be regarded as "moral
involvement" and alienation high intensity can be regarded
as "alienative involvement". Between the two lies a milder
zone of "calculative involvement".18
compliance relationships can be characterized in terms
of the kinds of power applied and in terms of the participants
orientation i.e. the patterns of involvement. Only three among
the nine possible types of comliance relations are, however,
empirically prevalent, as Etzinioni holds. They are: normative
powerand moral involvememnt, remunerative power and calculative
involvement, coercive power and alienative involvement. In
these"congruent types". as they are called, the orientation
patterns of the participants ate the same as the kinds of in-
volvement that are likely to be generated by the corresponding
kinds of power, These congruent types are more frequent, Etzioni
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argues, because the application of a power means is likely
to be effective if there is, in support of it, the correaponding
pattern of participant involvement, The effective applicaation
of normative powers, for example, requires that the participant
be highly committed, To be effective in goal-attainment, the
supra-agency is under the strain of applying a power means
that is congruent with the clienta' involvement,19 Effectiveness,
however, need not be the only guding value and the suprs-
agency is not just passively accepting a specific pattern
of involverment, Under the pressures of other value-considerations,
the supra-agency may in fact develop the power means that may
evoke in the paricipants the kinds of orientation that is
desirable in terms of these values and that is supportive of
the kind of power applied, The supra-agency, for example, may
apply the kind of normative powers that generate cmmottment
in the participants which in turn supports the effective
application of normative powers, Whether the supra-agercy is
able to use a kind of power means depends ultimately of course
on the availability of these power means, A hypothesis we
suggest on this account is: Giver the supporting power means
are available, the supra-agency may specialize in the application
of the kind of power that may generate the type of involvement
desired by the supra-agency,
We designate the predominant kind of power appliec by
the supra-agency to generate the corresponding kind of parti-
cipant involvement its power strategy, Depending on the kinds
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of power strategies employed and the types of involvement




Power str tteg:y Normative Remunerative Coercive
Involvesent Moral Calculative Alienative
involvement involve- involve-
ment ment
We can further distinguish, within each pattern of
diffusion, ..two slib--types. of strategies: positive strategy,
oriented to allocating rewards and negative strategy,
oriented to allocating deprivations. Though analytically
distinct, the two may be used together in various combinations.
It is true that even in the case when 'positive strategy-' is
applied, persons who are-relatively less rewarded m.ay feel
deprived, and vice versa for the case when -negative strategy
is adopted. 20 'fie are less interested, however, in. how the in-
dividual may feel-whether relatively deprived or otherwise-
as in the situations in which the supra-agency is concerned
with the systematic allocation :of rewards and in situations
in which the reverse i.s. the case. How each pattern of planned
diffusion administer the two sub-strategies is an empirical
question. It is likely, however, that pattern A may adopt
a positive strategy when the participants are highly committed
and alternatively a negative strategy when it is not the case.
It is. likely also that pattern C would more frequently apply
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a negative strategy than a positive one.
Which pattetn of planned diffusion is mor e effective
in effecting change? Theis is a question largely to be answered
empirically. It is likely, however, that with moral involve-
ment, the clients are mor committed to change than they are
calculatively or alienatively involved, For the clients are
positively, cathectically and evaluatively, oriented to the
power applied. However, since"normative power depends on the
manipulation of aymbols", hence"dependent on 'meanings'"21,
it is important that the supra agency has to "menaningfully"
represent the innovation and the innovation situation to the
clients. Normative power is likely also to be effective if
the supra-agency prepares conditions for formulating and
articulating the kinds of sentiments and attitudes in the
clients which are coducivc to their moral involvementr strategies
aiming at the re-education and re-socialization of the clients may
be adopted,
Our position in this paper is; planned diffusion in
Communitst China exhibits featres which are characteristic of
pattern A i,e, a normative power strategy is applied by the
supra-agency to geberate the clients'moral invllvoment, The
predominant kind of power means used by the Party in supporting
its directives are symbolic rather than material and phyaical.
Ideology provides the values and norms in terms of which aymbolic
rewards and puishment become meaningful to the peasants and
cadres inbolved. Ideology supplies also the guiding values
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in terms of which the Party formulates its power strategy, which
has to be organized through the creation and resolution of
social conflict. The two sub-strategies are administered through
the organization of two distinct kinds of social conflict: emu-
lation campaigns, oriented to the allocation of symbolic rewards,
and "struggles", oriented to the distribution of symbolic
deprivations.
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Conflict as strateg--emulation campaign
Positive and negative strategies can be administered
respectively through -the operation of two kinds of social
conflicts: a "positive" kind, competition, and a "negative"
kind, which, for lack of a better word, we call "negative
Conflict", which involves the display of hostility arid aggression
at antagonists. Though both forms of social conflicts involve
competitors", the former-, in its pure form, consists in the
competitor aiming his strength at the target and the latter,
the contender directing his strength at the adversary.22 How
conflict becomes a social instrument for the administration of
positive and negative strategies remains to be analyzed. Before
proceeding further, however, we need to draw on the work of
George Siinrcmel, whose treatment of the nature and. functions of
competition is relevant here.
Competition is, in the first place, not a weaker form
of social conflict. "This kind of competition equals all other
kinds of conflict in intensity and passionate effort. It is
pushed to its utmost concentration by the reciprical con-
sciousness. of the participants that each of them so concentrate."23
Unlike "negative: conflict", though, it does not result in the
mutual annihilation of the contenders. "Antagonism becomes
purely formal,"24 Also, unlike "negative conflict", which
benefits only the party ZwwThich wins, it rewards every party
involved: the winner, "the loser who benefits from the victory
of the victor".25 and the supra-individual, objective or social
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unit which supersedes the fight. "Each party fights its act.-
versary without turning against him, without touching him, so
to speak."26 From the standpoint of the society, it is not
ultimately who wins but the fulfillment of a social objective
through the concentrated effort of the participants that matters
From the standpoint of the competing parties, "it uses the
production of objective values as means for attaining sub-
jective satisfaction."27 Competition, moreover, brings the
competitors closer together, increases their knowledge of
each other, compeils them to learn of each other's strengths
and weaknesses and in this way comes to serve a socializing
and civil_izin function,"28
Rendered into our conceptual scheme, competition is
capable of morally involving the participants in planned
goal-attaining collective activities through the systematic
distribution of symbolic rewards and punishment. It fosters,
moreover, the sharing of experiences and ideas by bringing the
competitors together. As it is concerned more with allocating
rewards rather than with punishment, it serves as a positive
strategy.
These central features of competition can be foiund in
socialist emulation drives organized in Soviet Russia and
Communist China.
Writing in 1917, Lenin appealed to the Soviet Govern-
ment to organize for nation-wide emulation cam-oaigns: "Socialism
not only does not suffocate emulation. For the first time in
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history it also creates the possibilities for really extensively 
and intensively making use of emulation drives to attract the 
actual majority of the laborers to this workers’ stage on 
which they can demonstrate their skills and actualize their 
potentiality and ability....It is only at this point of history 
■ that the masses are not prevented from acting up to their
achievement-motivation, participating in emulation drives and
' 29developing the spirit of innovative-creativity." Noting also
the superior power of competition in realizing "objective values", 
Lenin commended it as "the most important and most crucial con­
ditions for guranteeing the victory of the new socialist system". 
"Capitalism can ultimately be overcome and will be overcome," 
he said, "because socialism is able to realize much higher 
productivity."^ Emulation drives are also regarded highly 
by Stalin. They are "the communist strategy for constructing
. socialism", and, "on the basis of socialism, the lever for -
31transforming the country's entire economic and cultural life." “ 
Emulation drives are significant, it is apparent, because 
they provide a system of incentives which is consistent with 
ideology and because around the distribution of symbolic rewards 
collective goal-directed activities can be organized.
In Communist China, this positive strategy of conflict 
is purposefully adopted for the planned diffusion of agro-technical 
innovations. It becomes the social instrument for resolving the 
"contradictions" between "the advanced" and "the backward". The 
key features of emulation drives as theoretically understood
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by the Chinese can be found in an article written by two uni-
versity students:
(1) During the process of competetion, "opposites"-
"the advanced" and "the backward"; the good" and
the bad; "the upstream" and. "the downstream"--
become differentiated.
(2) "The advanced" are commended. They become "models
and "red flags" For emulation. "Heroic revolutionary
spirit" and "socialist honours" are the sources of
their motivation.
(3) "The backward" are "criticized" by the standards
achieved by"the advanced. "The emulation campaign
is a great movement for the self-education, criticism
and self-criticism of the masses. Educated and
motivated the masses become advanced in thought."32
(4) When both "the advanced" and. "the backward" are
spurred on respectively by "socialist honours" acid
"criticism", "the middle cannot afford to linger.
(5) The "socialist emulation ca pagn" is a correct
way of handling the contradictions between the
advanced and the backward, which never stop
ari. sink . Only when they are continuously solved can
production and productivity be elevated. The basic
strategy for solving these contradictions is edu-
cation in the Cemnunist ideology. But the appropriwte
tactic is the continuous promotion of"the backvvard'
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to the standards achieved bythe advanced through
the self-conscious effort-of the masses and through
education and criticism. The passage quotes Liu
Shao Ch'i: "The struggle by the thousands and millions
of laborers, led in the front by the advanced pro-
ducers, for eliminating backwardness constitutes
a powerful moving force for the incessant progress
of socialise."33
(6) The purpose of the emulation campaign is to
popularize advanced standards from a point to the
entire "surface" and from the "advanced producers"
to everyone involved. Advanced standards become
universal standards.
(7 )This requires the competitors helping each other
like brothers. Socialist emulation campaign is
also a co-ordinated co-operative campaign in which
the participating units and individuals assist one
another, learn from one another and rake progress
together.34
The implications of emulation drives-,besides serving
as a positive strategy for the supra-agency, are important to
note. The Party and Government can control what is communicated
among Whom by modelizing the innovator or the successful
adobter of an "advanced ex perience", which isthen diffused
through emulation relations to the coupe titors involved: The
usual first step undertaken by the Party in the organization
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of emulation drives is to set up models for emulation:
L Modelization The purposeful generation and develop-
ment of an agricultural model for nation-wwride emulation arrived
at a spectacular climax in 1964 when Chairman Mao called for
all communes and teams in the country 'to model Tachai' s grin-
ciple of self_reliance in their production construction."35
Although it was repeatedly stressed that it was the Tachai
spnirit"--"the principle f politics taking command and ideology
taking the lead the spirit of self-reliance and hard work; and
the communist style of loving the State and the collectivity"
which was the primary objects for emulation, Tachai Brigade
was modelized probably because it was also an "advanced production
unit". The "Learn From Tachai movement not only calls for the
emulation of Tachai' s superior institution and hard-workir3 g
spirit but also the way it undertakes scientific farming and
36innovates production-increasing, farming measures, The movement
is at the same time a program of agro-technical development.
By 1965, a nation-wide "pi-hseuh-kan-pang-ch "ao "(emulate ,learn,
overtake, help and surpass) mass movement for "Learning and
Overtaking Tachai was extensively organized. A report written
by the Yu hsien Party Committee described how they organized
for the movement :
Yd hsien began to "learn" from Tachai in 1963. The Party
Commit tee understood that it would be difficult to carry through
the movement if-local templates of Tacha.i were not first developed,
Leading cadres left their offices and went to the field--the
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-practice was called tun-tien, which literally means aquatting
on the point_--to worked with the -aea*sants,As soon as any good
local farming experience:-was discovered, they organized on-the-spot
conferences inviting representatives from neighbouring brigades
to participate. Through continuous improvements, the brigade
was gradually brought up into an advanced brigade with a .
nurtured advanced experience of its own. Twelve such brigades
were similarly brought into being. In 1964, they became pace--
setters for other brigades in the Learn and Overtake Tachai
movement. By 1965, one hundred and twenty seven other pace-
setters were similarly established by twelve other Commune
Party committees. These local Tachais were convincing models.
because they were locally generated and because the masses
were involved in their creation. ' In 1-965, one hundred and
forty-nine I-tai -erh (one brings two) advanced experiences
extension networks were set up. Each brin`ing' two other
bro ther-brigades , one hundred and forty-nine pace-setters
entered into emulation and helping relations with three
hundred and eithty two other average and backwards brigades.
All the five hundred and thirty-one brigades in the whole hsien
were as a result, involved in the :,earn from Tacna.i 11 -movement.37
2. Associ .tion The competitors beccl.me more closely
associated with one another, which encouraged the active sharing
of advanced. experiences among -the. Hsiung-p' in. .q- was the-
pace-setter for three other brother-brigades in an one brings two
network. `Nhenever it tried out any innovation:, successfully,
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it passed ir over to the other three. Whenener the latter
learnt of any progress made by Hsiung-p'ing, they organized
study trips to learn the innovation on the spot and adopted
the innovation when they wen tback hom. In 1964 alone, the
members of the network met and exchanged experiences eleven
times. The First Secretary of hsiung-p'ing personally made
thirteen teaching- trips to the other brigades. The result
was impressive. Hisung-p'ing's per acre yield reached 935
catties , a net increase of 336 catties over the last year's
599 catties. The other three brigades also showed progress.
Per zcre yield incrresaed by 123 to 186 catties.38
3. Evaluation Individual and team performance were
annually evaluated and symbolic rewards--honour titles like
"five-good teams" and "five-goodmembers"*--were distributed.
In the first season of 1965, Yu hsien commended altogether
eight hundred and sixty nine "five-good' production teams
* The syetem of allocating rewards in terms of good
performance in five dimensions of activites was promulgated
by Chou En-lai in February1963, Provinces seemed to vary
over specific "five-good" details. In Hupei, the "five-good"
members were those who were (1) good in loving the State and
the commune:"(2) good in productive laboru:(3) good in conforming
to order;(4)good in unity and helpong one another and (5)good
in eonomizing houshold expenditure. The "five good" teams
were those which were (1) good in political thought' (2) good in
promoting tyhe production of the collectivity;(3) goon in
carrying out policiea;(4) good in satisfying the State's require-
ments and (5) good in caring for the livelihood of the massed.
See Mainland Today (Hong Kong)No.206.1964.pp 25-26 for references.
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and twenty four thousand "five good" members.39In nsiao-
yen-kou Brigade, also in Yu shien, evaluations were conducted
monthly, quarterly, and annually. "Five-good" individuals and
teams in monthly evaluations could have their names entered
into the "five-goodrecord books. Victors in quarterly evalua-
tions were seated on the stage of honour. Annual winners
were awarded the "five-good" certificates and certain material
benefits.40
The frequent evaluation of performance suggests that
there may be a very high degree of fluidity in the system of
prestige-status. To retain his. status, an individual has to
constantly strive for upkeeping his standard and oubidding his
rivals. Yu hsien's reports contain an interesting case in
which the Nan-kou brigade, which was originally leading at
a distance Ch'ao-chia-nao Brigade and Ku-chia-kou Brigade.
in the construction of Tachai fields, was overtook in a
spring quarter evaluation. The cadres of Nan-kou took step
at once to organize a campaign rectifying the disposition of
contentment both within and outside the Party and at all levels
of the administration. Extra effort was applied into basic
field construction, work. The next evaluation savi Iran-kou
corm-vended as "advanced"again.41
The normative strategy could remain effective, it
appears, as long as the symbolic rewards are rmeaningfui to
their recipients. This could be confounded, it seems, by
the depreciating pay-off of the reward to its recipient when
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more of it is accured. Tachai Brigade reportea sucn a ueriuuiicy ,
though recognizing it as induced by the "pride" of the brigaobP,
members. "Tachai was awarded a red banner in 1949 by the hsien.
It was much valued by the members. Later, when Tachai got more
and more banners, it sank into ob Avion. Even newly acquired
red banners were not as valued."42 A re0ctification was or-
ganized to right the deviation. How to maintain the significance
of the symbolic rewards o the peasants must have been one of
the Party's engaging problems. Prealems.
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Conflict as strategy--"struggle"
The effectiveness or the poseive strategy of emu-
lation campaign depends on the. committment of the peasants.
When the coi nittment of the peasants is in question, a different
strategy has to be employed which can reformulate their sentiments
and attitudes and systematically motivate and involve them in
.the planned. diffusion of innovations. In China, this is achieved
through applying the conflict strategy of "struggle". After
commending on the achievement of emulation drives in fostering
production in 1-959, an article, for example, followed with
saying: "We owe the glorious achievement we made in production
to the victories of the great rectification campaign and the
anti-rightist movement. Precisely it is because of the airing
of one's view, and contending and debating to the fullest ex-
tent and publicizing one's views in tatzupao, after which
people are able to distinguish the white from the black, that
people's thought becomes liberated from the corruption of
capitalist ideology. When thought is liberated, the great
productive potentiality of the Chinese working
is also set free,"43 Before proceeding to describe how conflict
is used as a strategy , we need to draw on the work of Lewis
Coser .
Adopting Sin mel' s central thesis that "conflict is
a form of socialization" , which means that social groups
require both hanronious and disharmonious processes to maintain
structure and processes, Coser basically maintains that conflict
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is functional to the maintenance and persistence of group
life. Among its other functions, conflict serves to enhance.
group cohesion, maintain group identity, enforce group adaptability
and. create associations and coalitions among members on the same
side of a conflict. To keep these functions alive, it may even
be, Simnel holds, "a piece of political wisdom to see to it
that there be some enemies in order for the unity of the members
to remain effective and for the group to remain conscious of
this unity as its vital interest."44 Coser goes further to
argue that groups may even search for enemies--which may
either be inner to or outside of the group, either be imaginary
or actual---in order to strengthen its cohesion when threatened
by a relaxation of energies or by internal dissension."644 The
mechanism of scapegoating may in such circumstances operate
to objective the threat. Through his sacrifice, the scapegoat
purifies the grouo and lulls the group together, The scape-
goat may just be a dissenter who does not directly constitute
the threat or he may simply be invented to serve the needs of
the group."45The conscious creation of social conflicts may
have a number of implications for the supra-agency. Scape-
goating beeomes a means of ailocating symbolic puniishment.The
imminence of a threat activates group consciousness, illicits
the members' coimnitttment, mobilizes their energy and attention
and urges them to go out to each other. Collective goal-oriented
activities become justifiable in terns of the security of the
group. Scape-Boating, or the danger of being scape-oated, can
become normative. power moans at the supra-agency's dis1o sal .
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The ideology of the chinese communist Party suppplies
teh resources in terms of which the Party can always keep
alive the imminence of the threat by class enemies. Though
the economic base of the capiitalist was liquidated , capitaliam,
it was maintained, was always seeking the opportuity to revive
its power, Not until the funal trace of capitalist thought was
extinguished in the people's mind can the socialist system be
free from the threat.'Grass struggles habe not yet expired.
The question of which provails. socialiam or capitalism, has
not been finally settled,struggles will be long term, din-
lectical, and at time violent, In the entire period or our
country's transition to communismm its major cotradictions
will still be the contradictios between the proletariat and
the capitalists and between the two roads of socialism and
capitalism.:46 This ideological stance allows the Party to
arbitrarily define the political feature of a contradiction.
Contradictios among the people created in the process of
innovation diffusion may be regarded as "contradifctions among
the people themselves". Theeymay also, however, be defined as
"contradictios between ourselves and the enemies". Writing
in 1939 , the kinister of Agriculture observed,"Recently the
right opportunists have got hold of several cases of over-
close plonting to launch bitter attacks on thekight Point
Chorter, the Great Leap Forward in agriculture, the People's
communce, and the general lino of socialist conotruction. we
must clearly distinguish critioism offered by people who are
seriously concerned with the people's cntornrise,from the
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resistance to technical innovations put up by the right con-
servative, and from. the attacks launched by the right opportunists.
We should listen to the advice and accept the criticism of the
former. We should educate the right conservative with reasons
and fact We should severely punish the right opportunists,"47
.A report written by the Jin-yang hsien party Colmmittee may
demonstrate the way the threat of Wclass enemies,"kept alive
by ideology, was used to structure the mechanism of scape-
Boating into a negative strategy of conflict:
"The Shi-kiao Commune of the Tuan-chuang Brigade is a
famous 'backward brigade' in the whole hsien. In the past,
because it was contaminated by Liu Shao-ch'i's anti-revolutionary
line and corrupted by the class enemies, it had very serious
capitalist inclination. The leaders were very careless and agri-
culturl yields diminished every year...Last spring, a cadre from
the hsien Party Committee came to squatt on the brigade again.
He made a thoroughgoing analysis of the situation and was able
to articulate the complications of class struggles and the
problem in its backwardness. He discovered at the same time
that there were positive elements. The Ira sses then brought off
class struggles, dealt a severe blow to the class enerriies, and
commended good people and good deeds in the struggles. The
initiative and activism of the cadres and members was mobilized.
The whole brigade then carried through a mass movement for
water-works construction, deer ploughin, and fertilizer
collection."48
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When a negntive strategy is applied, the."rich middle
peasants" became the convenient scapegoat. A. Jenmin jihpao
reporter described how this took place in a brigade in the
province of Fukien:" Minching hsien was organizing a move-
ment to learn from Tachai and the local standard-bearer,
K'oyang. After vi siting K'oyang, the Changyang Party Branch
cadres decided to mobilize the masses to learn. from Tachai.
A reactionary rich-peasant rebuked the movement. Applying
the le scion they learnt from K'oyang, the Party Branch organized
the masses to struggle against this rich peasant . and give a
severe blow to the class enemies. This educated the cadres
and the. masses and enforced their consciousness in class
struggles, line struggles and continuous revolution. The
Mass movement of learning from rom Tachai in the whole brigade
was thus able to develop healthily."49
Punishing the "rich middle peasant" and mobilizing
the support of the poor and lower-middle peasants was the
Party's consistent policy in the village. Summarizing the
Party'sclass policy in the rural areas, the Miinister of
Agriculture observed in 1959: "The policy of the Party in
the village is always to give first consideration to the
interests of the poor and lower-middle peasants, who consti-
tute seventy percent of the rurl population, and to give
second consideration to the middle peasants, who constitute
twenty percent of the rural population. The Party saw to it,
however, that in various previous struggles the middle peasants
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were united...Precisely because of the insistence of the Party
on the policy of relying on the poor and lower-middle peasants
and uniting ninety percent of the billage population the
Party able to mobilize the activism of more than ninety percent
of the people...For this reason, though we experienced in the
past ten years radical mass struggles and great revolutions
like the land reform, agricultural co-operativization and
communization, not noly did we prevent possible damages and
low yields created by revolutionary movements, we were also
able to promote the development of agricltural production
by channeling into productive actibities the activism and
enthusiasm of the masses which was engendered in the course
of revolutionaty movements."50 Schurmann notes that internal
conrlicft within the billage between the rich and the poor
peasants was and still is a major aociological factor In the
Chinese billage.51 IF theis observation is corrcct, the Party's
policy of selective mobilization in the village is able to
meke use of this sociological factor ato undcrtake socinal
movements supported by the negative strategy of "struggle"
with a well calculated probability of success.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CADRE AS CHANGE AGENT
Introduction
Although "an uninterrupted span of control from pro-
vincialparty committes to production-unit Party commmittee1
was set up as a result of a policy of decentralization in 1957,
practical autonomy in planning, directing and co-ordinating
agricultural production was vested in the hsien Party com-
mittee."Hsien is the Party's combat-unit in the rural work
directed and organized by the Party. The hsien Party committee
is the battle head-quarter guiding and organizing the three
great revolutionary movements of class struggles, production
struggles and scientific experiments in the village. General
and specific policies of the Party have to be implemented by
the hsien Party committee."2 General policy directives from
echelon above reach the hsien committees and become, at this
level, translated into concrete measures that become implemented
in the hsien. The key agent who play sb.n active role in the
chain process of policy translation at various basic levels
are the cadres of the hsien and commune Party committees and
the secretaries of Party branches in brigades and production
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teams.
A precise definition of kanpu, the cadre, is contained
in a dictionary published in 1954: "Cadre:generally speaking,
it means a worker in a state institution. Persons who work in
state institutions or a department of production, capable of
unifyin and leading the masses to carry out Party and govern-
ment policies and directives, to implement duties and programs-
promptly-under the leadership of the Party and higher-level
government institutions are cadres."At the same time, the
cadre must possess revolutionary character and revolutionary
work manner, be capable of cementing ties with the masses and
taking the leads actively. In other words, he must be capable
of being the tutor of the masses and in turn being the pupil
of the masses."3 Central to our concern in this definition is
the notion that the cadre, in his capacity as the "worker in a
state institution", lines the Party and government to the"masses",
Party and government policies are implemented by and through
the cadre who ideally is capable of unifying and leading the
masses", establishing ties with them, mobilizing them for
action, and "tutoring" as well. as "learning" from them. He is,
in this sense, the change agent,who functions as a communication
link between the supra-agency--the Party and government--and
the clients-the peasants, and who seeks to implement the
change-programs formulated by the supra-agency.
We are concerned in this chapter with analyzing the role
of the rural cadres in the planned diffusion of agro-technical
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innovations in Communist, China..
Numerous research has been conducted by. diffusion re-
searchers on the role of the change agent. Relevant to our
immediate interest here are a series of propositions, _ generalized
from extensive empirical findings, about factors which play a
part in the change agent's relative success in securing the
adoption of innovations by his clients. Among these factors are:
(1)Wthe extent of c.lange agent effort : Planned change pro-
grams in sixty-nine Brazilian communities, seventy Nigerian
villages, and a hundred and eight Indian villages suggest that
one of the most fundamental factors in success is-the extent of
change agent contact and communication. 'Success' villages,
as contrasted with 'failure' villages, were characterized by
change agents who contacted more-clients, who spent fewer days
in their offices and more in the village, and who generally
played an active rather than a passive role in the change
process.'4
(2)his client-orientation, rather than change agency-
orientation: Client-orientation--oriented to the client's ex-
oectation---rather than orientation to the bureaucratic ex-
pectation of the change agency allows the change agent to be
more feedback minded, to have close rapport and high credi-
bility in the eyes of the clients, and to base their programs
of cha.n ge' on the. clients' needs,"5
(3) the degree to which his pro gram i s compatible with
the clients' needs: Though one of the roles of the change
agent is to develop and shape the needs of the client in the
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planning of change, programs of change are more likely to
succeed if they are compatible with the clients' needs.. Diagnosis
of the clients' needs and designing the pro rain on the basis
of the diagnosis is desirable.6 We will examine how in China
the contradiction between centralized planning and compatibility
with loal needs is resolved.
(4) the change agent's empathy with the clients: The
ability of the chant e Q^,°nt to project himself into the role
of the client allows the change agent to share the feelings of
the client and understand the client's needs from the position
of the client. Again, empathatic understanding appears to pre-
suppose close contact. 7
(5) the change agent's hornophil y with the clients:
Homophily is here defined as the degree to which pairs of
individual who interact are similar in certain attributes,
such as beliefs, values education, social status and the like. 8
More efficient communication appears to occur between the change
agent and the c,.ient when they are more homophilous than hetero-
phil ous . 9
(6) the extent to which he is able to work through opinion
leaders: The change agent is likely to succeed if he-is able
to identify and mobilize the opinion leaders, whose influence
of other members in the social system gains passage for the
innovation. 10
(7)his credibility in the eyes of his clients: Credibility
is defined as the degree to which a communication source or
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channel is perceived as trustworthy and competent by the receiver.'
It ap years plausible that a change agent can increase his credi-
bility if he can demonstrate. his technical competence.
(8)his efforts in increasing his clients' ability to
evaluate innovations: Improving the client's technical com-
petence in evaluating an innovation may contribute to the
success of change programs in the long run.12
We will examine. in this chapter how these propositions:
may bear validity in terms of the rural cadre's activities in
the Planned diffusion of agro-technical innovations.
The Chinese offer a different standpointe frdm which
the-qualities of the cadre can be ecamined. He is expected
to be "both red and expert" because he is, editorializes the
Jermin jihxpao, "bearing the great banner of revolutionary
strugles and controlling the entire program of production
construction."13
The cadre is expected to be red because "socialist
society is still impregnated with class struggles and the class
struggles in the village are especially complicated."14
is required to be "expert in production because "in the
continuation of class strLiggles, production struggles and
Scientific experiments become more and more inportant."15 Ex-
pertise in agricultural production is desirable because in
struggling to develop a ricultural production, to trans-
form the land, to create a new world,, to change old habits
and to create new ways of living,"16many tough problems are
69
bound to appear which require cadres with rich experiences
and techniques to have them solved. As advanced producers'',
the cadres are not only required to be well versed with the
whole set of conventional farming techniques, but also capable
of innovating." "New techniques are not born.ausomatically. As
a rile, cadres should innovate on the basis of local. traditional
agricultural techniques. More importantly, they should innovate
on the .basis of the collective economy and on the basis of the
support given to agri culture by the State. Rural Party branch
secretaries are mostly in the middle age. They are best suited
to be innovators because they both understand the old situations
and the new conditions provided to agricultural production by.
the socialist system, "l7 The Party's decision in 1957 to transfer
light industry to the provincial' level meant not only that
light industries had to draw resources from agriculture but
also that agriculture itself, unsupported by modern technology
and capital, had to develop on local resourees,18 The "expert"
cadre is expected to play an active role in fostering agricultural
development through developing innovations on local resources.
The change agent is at the same time an innovator.
"Redness 'and expertise suggests other important impli-
cations9 however, when it is interpreted in terms of the
structural and organizational fraI eviork provided by the planded
diffusion of agro-technical innovations applying a normative
power strategy, to which we now turn.
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The milieu of change agentuy
Strategies of change in the planned diffusion of agro-
technical innovations in Communist China are shaped and cons-
trained by three distinct sets of factors that constitute the
"milieu of chnge agentry".These three sets of factors are
namely (1) the plannedness of diffusion, (2) the normative
strategy adopted,and (3) the attributes of agro-technnical
innovations.
1.The plannedness of diffusion Planned diffusion re-
quires the supre-agency not noly to have a bird's-eye view
of the ontire copass of planned activities but also to attend
to local geographical,climatic,and socio-economic details.
This dilemma was discerned by the Eirst Secretary of a Party
provincial committee:"Agricultural production is strongly
conditioned by local environment,In making guidance in agri-
cultural production, we should consider variations in local
natural conditions and characteristics in production. Adapt
to local conditions. Divide into regions and administer dif-
ferentially....socialist agricuture is founded on collective
economy. Being laarge in scope, it comprises mumerous facets
of activities, To have planning and to be able to adopt
advancad technology, we must not lead blindly, Neither, how-
ever, can we tolerate laissez faire, we have concrete
practical leadership in agricultural production."19 Many
instances could be foud in which cadres, without observing
local needs,implement commands from higher levels, The mis-
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takes they committed, on this ground, were "bureaueratism" ,
commanism", and "subjectivism". The Secretary of the Party
Provincial Committee of Kwangtung has this to say,"It is very
easy for us to commit the mistake of subjectivism in the ex-
tension of innovative technical measures. The mistake of
subjectivism is expressed in the behavior of deviating from
the principle of 'giving free vein to the people and subjecting
everything to test', carelessly extending technical measures
which have not been subjected to tests and which have not yet
satisfied the masses. As a result, loss.vas ..procured and the
masses were dissatisfied."20 The same situation vvas observed
in Kupei, said a leading cadre,"The root of the problem lies
here: Without immersing ourselves in production and grasping
the key problems whiahvary with places, time, and types of
production, we often provide only general directives without
concrete guidance. For this reason, we cannot help committing
the mistakes of subjectivism. bureaucratism and commandism. 21
The problem nosed by planned diffusion to the cadre is one of
translating general polio directives into concrete policy
measures that observe local conditions and local needs. To
really grasp the concrete features of the local situation,
the cadre, has to sendh-imself down n to the front line of agri
cultural cultural activities. In Mao's words, he has both to combine
the general with the particular and combine the leadership
with the masses . 2
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2.The normative strategy adopted The application
by the supra-agency of a normative strategy requires a change
agent who can directly paryicipate in an innobation situation,
interpret its meaning, allocate symbolic rewards and puishment,
and formulate the sentiments and attitudes of the clicnts.This
role id played by the rural cadre,who is ,in this respect,very
much a political architect responsible for constructing , in
terms of ideology , the political meanign of an innovatio
situation. He is responsible for naming the political features
of an innobation situation and in this way creates the conditions
for the organization of class struggles. The quality demanded
by the Party of such a change agent role is "redness".
3.The attributes of agro-technical innovations In
constructing the political meaning of an innovatios situation,
the normative attributes of "advancednss","authoritativeness"'
"significance","political risk" and "compatinility withe ideo-
logical canona" become useful resources drawing on which the
cadre may may meaningfully represent the innovation to the peasants.
Again,"redness" is in question. The social attribute of
"collective economic risk" and the intrinsic sttribute of
"testability" require the cadre to provide arrangementsfor
testing the innovation before it is popularized, The intrinsic
attribute of "demonstrabillity" makes it desirable for the
cadre to demonstrate the effectivenes ot and innovation, which
implies he needs also to demonatrate his technical competence.
These two sets of demands make "expertise" a desirable quality.
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change agentry--the chinese style
The Party's answer to the problems posed by these sets
of constraints is to send the cadres down to the front line
of production and ask them to"squatt on a point"-- tun-tion--
and cultivate"test plots", The cadre is asked to emerge from
the milieu of bureaucracy and relate himself directly to the
peasants i nthe fields.
In February 1958,the Party central cormittee called
on cadres at all levels and in all departments to adoopt the
tun-tuen system as a key method and atyle of lesership: "Cul-
tivating experimental plotas is a thorough way of overcoming
bureaucratism and subjectivism, It helps to exorcize bureeu-
cratic airs and allows the cadres to really go into the masses
and lead them, It enables the cadre to become' both red and
expert' and realize the unification of politics and techniques.
We want niether pragmatists who lose boarings nor politicians
unsubstantiated by technical skills."23
The implications of the tun-tion system as understood
by the party is spelled out much more fully in an editorial in
the jenmin jihpao:"Leaoing cadres of the Party hsien and
communo committees must frequently immerso thomselves into
the basic level--in accordance with the system--and join the
basic level cadres adn peasants in collective labour for a
definite period of time every year (1) in order to better
understand the class situations in the village, correctly
organize class struggles, correctly hangle the contradictions
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between ourselves and the enemies and the contraa.icdons
amomg the people thezselves, uniting more than ninety percent
of the people and effectively bringing off socialist revolution
and socialist construction in the village (2) in order to
correctly and thoroughly implement the -Party's series of
general and snpecific policies in the village, developing and
consolidating the collective economy, enriching the village
and effectively supporting our country's socialist industrial
construction (3) in order to learn the techniques of production
strugglesbetter, continuously elevate their standards of scientific
knowledge and become really both 'red' and 'expert'. Leading
hsien and commune cadres will be divorced from the cadres of
the wide rural base, separated from the broad peasantry, alienated
from the reality of rural classs truggles and production
struggles, and commit the serious mistakes of subjectivism
and bureaucratism if, Making guidance in agricultural pro-
duction without participating in agricultural collective pro-
ci ucti ve labour, they rely substantially on meetings and reports
to base their guidance. Our lea derssh.ip in rural work will
lag behind reality and fall behind the masses. It will fail to
meet the demands of the ever-drvelopifl and ever-changing situations
brought about by class struggles, production struggles, and
scientific e eriinents in the coLuntryside."(numbered by this
writer) 24.
In terms of pro Toting production through extending
agro-technical innovations, :the experimental plot system
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did seem to yield positive results. An article in the Jenmin
jihpao reports," Last year, every secretary of the Party hsien
committee of Mach'eng, and many cadres of other levels, parti-
cipated in the cultivation of experimental plots. The test-
plot--through which cadres may participate in production and
make guidance in production and through which warious agro-
technical innovations were popularized--was the key factor in
high yield in food and cotton in the hsien."25
How did the system work?
In Yu hsien ,only one Party hsien committee member
was stationed in the office. The rest either"squatted on a
point" or " ran over the surface"-- surveying a number of "points".
The hsien chairman hmself spent five moths in 1964 in the
fields and "ran over" more than a hundred brigades. His chief
work to do was to discover, create, and propagate "sdvanced
experiences". About 70 to 80 percent of the hsien cadres were
constantly out "squatting". Commune cadres spent a longer period
of time each year in the field--seven to eight months, Only one
cadre stayed persistently in the office . The rest went to the
brigades. usually supplying leadership and guidance. Hsien and
commune members had as a rule eighty eight to a hundred an
four days in the fields each year.26
In Tachai, the cadre-cultivated test-plot was made a
measuring rod for innovations irrrespective of where they ori-
ginate, "For more than ten years now, we have been treating
the test-plot a vital section of agro- technical innovation.
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New techniques and experiences, no matter where they come from
are subjected indiscriminately to test and comparison in the
test-plots."27 Qualified innovations can then be popularized.
In Tachai , the cadre also involved himself in committees of
"triple combinations" for scientific experimentation with
the old peasants and the young peasants, and the"masses" and
the technicians. As a result, "the masses were educated and
the youngsters were trained", and, "because our scientific
experimentation was rested on a mass base, we worked, made obser-
vations, discussed, and drew conclusions together from sowing
to harvesting. Innovations thus generated were firmly supported
by the masses. No one would cause trouble."28
In Mach'eng, the test plot became a workshop for the
cadre and a laboratory for innovations. The cadre developed
agro-technical knowledge as he engaged himself in experimentation.
Just as in Tachai, the "masses" and the technicians were in-
volved in the process. When any innovation was developed, on-
the-spot demonstration, evaluation. and conferences were organized.
"When the visitors,who brought the new ideas along with them,
returned to their own hsiang and communes, these ideas became
popularized in the whole hsien."29 In Yu hsien, not a specific
test-plot, but an entire brigade, on which the cadre "squatted",
became "modelized" for neighbouring brigades to emulate.30
In other cases, the cadre--usually from the hsien or
commune--"scquatting on a brigade or a productions team became
its political architect. Such stories as related below may
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illustrate how the cadre plays the role of a political archi-
tect, "Last spring, the Deputy Secretary of the party commune
committee came to squatt on teh Kuanch'ang Brigade with some
other cadres. Upon investigation, they discovered that the
primary reason for its backwardaness was that a bunch of class
enemies were promoting the capitalist road and undermining the
'Learn from Tachai' movement, In order to tranaform Kuanch'ang,
the cadres and the casses had to be armed with Chairman Mao's
revoluionary line, the small bunch of class enmied had to be
punished and the awkward wind of capitalism had to be stopped,
They mobilized the cadres and the masses to start study groups
for learning Mao Testun's thought . In the light of the realistic
struggles between the two classes, the two roads and the two
lines in the village, they also directed the masses and the
cadres to repeatingly study Chaiman Mao's teaching concerning
'Only Socialiam Can Save China' and the basic line of the
Paryt in the entire historical epoch of socialiam. At the
same time ,activities like 'remembering the past' and 'speaking
bitterness' were organized to expose and castigate revisionist
black-marker goods like' three-self and one undertaking' and
'four big liberalization' distributed by scoundrels of Liu
Shao-ch'i's kind ,all of suchwere crimes intendin to restore
copituliam. The masses were better able now to distinguish
between black and white in the struggles between the two roads
and the two lines."31 The cadre in this case was responsible
for naming" the struggles between the two roada" as the key
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political.feature of the situation. "Class enernies" were
singled out and punished. Through the process of "strugmle"
the cadre was able to reformulate the committment of the
peasants by hightening their "class consciousness".
Closer relations between the cadre and the peasants
become possible as he immerses/himself into the "masses". He
obtains more feed-back from his clients. "When a rural basic-
level cadre takes himself away from collective productive
labour, he becomes separated from the poor and lower-middle
peasants. Even if they have any thing to say, they will not"32
say it to the cadre. How can the cadre do his
Working with the peasants in the field, the cadre has more
contact with them. He is in a better position to establish
rapport with the peasants, to understand their needs, and
in fact, becoming himself a laborer, the cadre is more homo-
philous with the peasants. "This is to say: their feelings
and thought become the same as the feelings and thought of
the working people. The spiritual barrier between the cadres
and the masses melts away. "33 Programs of change developed
on such basis are more likely to be compatible with the peasants
needs.
The cultivation of test-plots allows the cadre to
demonstrate his technical competence. His credibility in the
eyes of the peasants increases. Chekiang jihpao reports a
story in which innovations gained acceptance as the cadre impressed
the peasants of his technical competence. "The majority of the
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cadres knew little about new techniques. some even uiu nu u
have any common sense knowledge. The masses complaint, 'They
were just able to talk, not act.' Dubious of the technical
competence of the cadres. they were reluctant to adopt double-
cropping. Noticing the problem, the cadre of the Party hsien
committee decided that the first thing to do was to teach the
cadres new techniques... In the following spring,the majority
of the cadres could ever instruct the peasants in actual
the field. This rid the peasants of worries about





Pulling all these lines of conceptualization together,
we may articulate a Chinnise model of innovation diffusion in
the following paradigm.
Planned diffusion of afro-technieal
innovations in Conm uni st China
Party
Normative to wrwer strategy
Emulation campaign:
-positive strategy of conflict
"Struggle":




Squatting on thenassed within the
point and cultivateht Point CharterEi
experimental plotsof agriculture
Qualities desiredt
both red and expert'
The Peasants
Pattern of involve-
men t desired by the Party:
moral involvement
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Not indicated in the paraigm but looming through the
entire analysis is the role of the ideology of the Chinese
Communist Party. Ideology provides the basic assumptions and
values that, we maintain, constrain the Party's formulation
of a normative power strategy that creates compliance relations
between the Party and the peasants by allocating symbolic power
means through emulation campaigns and "struggle". Ideology
provides the values and norms in terms of which symbolic
rewards and punishment allocated in emulation campaigns and
"struggle" become meaningful objects to the peasants. Ideology,
in other words, formulates the cathectic-evaluative orientation
of the peasants to the power applied. Ideology also provides
the values and norms that furnish the cultural context of
the agro-technical innovations, It becomes manifested in the
normative attributes of "advancedness", "authoritativeness",
"Significance", "political risk", and "conroatibility with
ideological canons". Ideology supplies the symbolic resources
drawing upon which cadres may arbitrate the political reality
and articulate the normative features of innovation situations.
The cadre's skill in interpreting ideology is what the Party
recognizes as the quality of "redness".
The Chinese model of innovation diffusion rests ulti-
mately on the committment of the peasants. Will the model fall
apart when ideology fails to motivate? Unfortunately, our
data, filtered as they are by the Chinese instruments of
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